> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://syscall.mintlify.site/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Runtime forensics for Linux

> Record real kernel activity, preserve attributable evidence, and investigate it from the CLI or a read-only workbench.

SYSCALL records process lifecycle, file-open, and IPv4/IPv6 connect activity with eBPF. It persists the result as a versioned SQLite evidence store and provides two read-only investigation surfaces: a command-line interface and a desktop workbench.

The recorder is a local operator tool. It does not hide the fact that Linux tracepoints are system-wide, and it does not present incomplete collection as complete evidence.

![SYSCALL workbench evidence overview](https://mintcdn.com/syscall/ThNNROJjSX_EwwQg/screenshots/overview.png?fit=max\&auto=format\&n=ThNNROJjSX_EwwQg\&q=85\&s=87f5c47b038df2a90fab665cff19d64d)

> [card] [Quickstart](https://syscall.mintlify.site/quickstart.md)
>
> Build the CLI, record a short session, and inspect the result in a few commands.

> [card] [CLI reference](https://syscall.mintlify.site/reference/cli.md)
>
> Every command, option, default, filter, and exit code in one place.

> [card] [How it works](https://syscall.mintlify.site/concepts/how-it-works.md)
>
> Tracepoints, decoding, attribution, storage, and the privilege boundary.

> [card] [Workbench](https://syscall.mintlify.site/guides/workbench.md)
>
> Open a recorded database in the read-only desktop investigation surface.

## What a session contains

| Event | Kernel source | What the record establishes |
| - | - | - |
| `process_exec` | `sched_process_exec` | A process image was executed, with the recorded filename and identity. |
| `process_fork` | `sched_process_fork` | A process or thread creation was observed and attributed to a tracked parent. |
| `process_exit` | `sched_process_exit` | A tracked process exited, with the recorded exit priority. |
| `file_open` | `openat` enter/exit | An `openat` attempt and its raw return value. It does not prove that file contents were read. |
| `network_connect` | `connect` enter/exit | An IPv4 or IPv6 `connect` attempt and its raw return value. It does not prove an established connection. |

A session also stores collection accounting, process-instance identity, timestamps, and provenance. That metadata is part of the evidence: a result with ring-buffer loss or unresolved ancestry is not equivalent to a complete recording.

## One recorder, two read paths

```text theme={null}
target process tree
        │
        ▼
  eBPF tracepoints ──► ring buffer ──► strict decoder ──► SQLite evidence
                                                              │
                                              ┌───────────────┴───────────────┐
                                              ▼                               ▼
                                         syscall CLI                  read-only workbench
```

Both read paths use the same storage queries, analysis engine, verification engine, and export logic. The desktop application does not reimplement forensic rules.

## Design commitments

| Commitment | Consequence |
| - | - |
| **Real telemetry only** | Collection comes from kernel tracepoints. Synthetic data is confined to the interface preview and is labeled as such. |
| **Identity before attribution** | Raw BPF IDs, observer-visible IDs, and canonical process instances remain distinct. PID reuse does not merge unrelated processes. |
| **Incompleteness is visible** | Filtered events, ring-buffer loss, userspace drops, malformed samples, persist failures, and unresolved identity are counted and surfaced. |
| **Analysis is explainable** | Deterministic rules link findings to persisted event IDs. Severity and confidence are investigative labels, not probabilities or verdicts. |
| **Investigation is read-only** | Inspection, analysis, verification, and the workbench never modify recorded evidence. Export writes a new package. |
| **No implicit privilege** | SYSCALL never invokes `sudo`, prompts for a password, or records from the desktop UI. |

## What SYSCALL does not do

> [!WARNING]
>
> SYSCALL does not capture file contents, packet payloads, memory, environment variables, DNS names, or keystrokes. A successful `connect` is not proof of an established session, TCP or UDP, reachability, or data transfer. An `openat` event is not proof of a read or write.

It also does not provide tamper-evident storage, a cryptographic chain of custody, kernel-side target filtering, or coverage for syscalls it does not hook. See [Limitations](https://syscall.mintlify.site/operations/limitations.md) before using the output in an investigation.

## Documentation map

| If you want to... | Start here |
| - | - |
| Record and inspect a first session | [Quickstart](https://syscall.mintlify.site/quickstart.md) |
| Install from source and verify the host | [Installation](https://syscall.mintlify.site/installation.md) |
| Understand the evidence model | [Evidence model](https://syscall.mintlify.site/concepts/evidence-model.md) |
| Look up a command or option | [CLI reference](https://syscall.mintlify.site/reference/cli.md) |
| Run an investigation | [Investigate a session](https://syscall.mintlify.site/guides/investigate.md) |
| Interpret findings | [Behavioral analysis](https://syscall.mintlify.site/guides/analyze.md) |
| Check evidence consistency | [Verification](https://syscall.mintlify.site/guides/verify.md) |
| Produce a portable package | [Evidence export](https://syscall.mintlify.site/guides/export.md) |
| Contribute to the codebase | [Development](https://syscall.mintlify.site/project/development.md) |


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